








































Does It Pay to Read Your Junk Mail? 
Evidence of the Effect of Advertising 
on Home Equity Credit Choices 
 








November 21, 2008 
WP 2008-09 
 Does It Pay to Read Your Junk Mail?
Evidence of the E®ect of Advertising
on Home Equity Credit Choices¤
Sumit Agarwal
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago






Je®ery L. and Cindy M. King Faculty Fellow and
Professor of Real Estate
Smeal College of Business
The Pennsylvania State University




¤We thank Jan Brueckner; Richard Buttimer; Souphala Chomsisengphet; Dimitris Christelis (European University
Institute Discussant); Henrik Cronqvist (AEA Discussant); Jim Follain; Fu Yuming; Bert Higgins; David Laibson;
Ken Lusht; Donna Nicholson; Devin Pope (NBER Discussant); John Quigley; Stuart Rosenthal; Nancy Wallace;
and the seminar participants at 2008 American Economic Association meeting in New Orleans; the 2008 NBER
Summer Institute; Baruch College; the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago; the National University of Singapore;
Syracuse University; the University of California-Berkeley; the University of North Carolina at Charlotte; and the
2007 Conference on Behavioral Approaches to Consumption, Credit, and Asset Allocation at the European University
Institute in Florence, Italy, for helpful discussions and comments. Research assistance ably provided by Lauren
Gaudino and Cosmin Lucaci. The views expressed in this research are those of the authors and not necessarily those
of the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.Does It Pay to Read Your Junk Mail?
Evidence of the E®ect of Advertising on Home Equity Credit Choices
ABSTRACT
We examine the e®ect of direct mail (commonly referred to as junk mail) advertising on individ-
ual ¯nancial decisions by studying consumer choice of home equity debt contracts. Consistent with
the theoretical predictions, we ¯nd that ¯nancial variables underlying the relative pricing of debt
contracts are the leading factors explaining consumers' home equity debt choice. Furthermore, we
also ¯nd that the intended use of debt proceeds signi¯cantly impacts consumer choice. However,
when we study a subset of consumers who received a direct mail solicitation for a particular debt
contract (¯xed- versus adjustable-rate), we ¯nd evidence that the relative pricing variables are
less relevant in explaining consumer contract choice, even though they were presented with a full
menu of debt contracts. Thus, our results are consistent with the view that advertising is persuasive.
JEL Classi¯cation: D1; D8; G21; M3
Keywords: Persuasion, Advertising, Contract Choice, Home Equity LendingIn 2005, the top 100 U.S. advertisers spent over $271 billion on marketing across all forms of
media. Of this amount, over $55 billion was spent on direct mail advertisements, making \junk
mail" second only to television (at $68 billion) in dollars expended on advertising.1 Financial
institutions spent over $8.4 billion marketing a wide variety of investment and credit products
(e.g., mutual funds, insurance contracts, bank accounts, credit cards, and mortgage loans to name
just a few of the major categories), making the ¯nancial services the fourth highest industry by
dollars spent on advertising.2
Obviously, one of the roles of advertising is to persuade the consumer to purchase a good or
service. Thus, a natural question arises: To what extent does advertising or persuasion impact
consumer ¯nancial decisions? We answer this question by examining the e®ect of direct advertising
(often referred to as \junk" mail) on one of the most important ¯nancial decisions facing households
{ the choice of mortgage contract type.
Financial economists now recognize that marketing and persuasion can a®ect consumer in-
vestment decisions. For example, studies of consumer investments in mutual funds indicate that
marketing plays an active role in determining the money °ow into funds.3 In addition to evidence
from mutual fund trading, Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004) ¯nd evidence linking ¯rm prod-
uct market advertising and investor interest. Furthermore, Barber and Odean (2005) document
that exogenous factors calling attention to particular stocks can a®ect investor purchase decisions.4
Thus, these studies reinforce the idea that marketing can and does impact ¯nancial decisions.
While previous research in economics and marketing indicates that advertising is e®ective, little
is known about the impact that advertising has on altering consumer evaluation of ¯nancial deci-
sions.5 That is, can advertising lead consumers to ignore important ¯nancial factors when faced
1Source: Advertising Age, June 26, 2006. (http://adage.com/images/random/lna2006.pdf)
2To put this in perspective, automotive, retail and telecom were the top three industries in terms of advertising
expenditures at $20.9 billion, $18.6 billion, and $9.9 billion, respectively (Source: Advertising Age, June 26, 2006).
3In one of the ¯rst studies to explicitly examine mutual fund marketing, Sirri and Tufano (1998) suggest that
mutual fund advertising lowers consumer search costs and that this can explain the link between advertising and
fund °ow. Similarly, Jain and Wu (2000) and Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2005) show that mutual fund advertising
is related to money °ow (investment). More recently, Cronqvist (2006) shows that mutual fund advertising impacts
investors' choices even though it provides little information. In addition, Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) ¯nd that mutual
fund °ows are positively related to positive news articles in the ¯nancial press.
4Although Barber and Odean (2008) do not explicitly examine the role of advertising, they do note that news
events, excessive trading volume, and extraordinary returns can a®ect investment decisions.
5The economics literature traditionally classi¯es advertising as being persuasive, informative, or complementary
(Bagwell, 2007). The informative view assumes that advertising simply conveys information, (e.g., Stigler, 1961; and
Nelson, 1974 and 1975.), while the persuasive view assumes that advertising can alter consumer preferences.
1with an economic decision? In one of the few studies to examine this question, Bertrand et al.
(2006) conduct a ¯eld experiment in South Africa, using personal loan contracts. Their experi-
ment presents evidence showing that variations in the psychological features of the advertisement,
as well as traditional economic variables, such as interest rates, impact consumer loan take-up
rates. The results from this ¯eld experiment are consistent with the ¯ndings of Russo, Carlson,
and Meloy (2006) that persuasive information can lead decision-makers to choose inferior alterna-
tives.6 At the theoretical level, Mullainathan, Schwartzstein, and Shliefer (2006) build a simple
model of persuasion that helps explain certain aspects of marketing { branding, advertisement, and
product attributes (also see Mullainathan and Shliefer, 2005) { while Shapiro (2006) theoretically
demonstrates that advertisement can be persuasive rather than informative.
To the best of our knowledge, little research has examined the impact that advertising and
persuasion can have on consumer choice in the mortgage market.7 Yet, for most households, their
mortgage is their single largest ¯nancial liability and the choice between ¯xed-rate mortgage (FRM)
versus adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) contracts can have a substantial impact on the overall cost
of home ¯nancing (Campbell, 2006). For example, the historic decline in interest rates between 2000
and 2003 resulted in a dramatic lowering of mortgage costs for ARM borrowers, which prompted
the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board to remark that U.S. homeowners \pay a lot of money
for the right to re¯nance and for the insurance against increasing mortgage payments" through
their preference for ¯xed-rate mortgages over adjustable-rate mortgages.8;9
We examine the consumer choice of ¯xed versus variable rate debt by focusing on the home
equity lending market in order to determine whether consumers rationally price the interest rate
6In a related area of the literature, numerous studies have focused on the role that information framing has on
individual decision choices (see, for example, Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, and Tversky and Kahneman, 1981 and
1986, among others.)
7Recently, Perry and Motley (2008) explore the di®erences in newspaper print advertising message content in the
Washington, D.C. metropolitan area aimed at the prime and subprime mortgage markets. Their analysis reveals that
newspaper print mortgage advertisements having persuasive elements were more common than print advertisements
containing informative elements.
8See remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan, Understanding household debt obligations at the Credit
Union National Association 2004 Governmental A®airs Conference, Washington, D.C. (February 23, 2004)
[http://www.federalreserve.gov/boardDocs/speeches/2004/20040223/default.htm].
9Previous research on mortgage choice indicates that borrowers rationally price the interest rate risk inherent in
adjustable-rate contracts. For example, Brueckner and Follain (1988) examined borrower choice for ¯rst mortgage
contracts and found that the interest rate di®erential between ¯xed-rate and adjustable-rate mortgages and the
interest rate level for ¯xed-rate mortgages are the primary factors explaining why borrowers choose ¯xed versus
adjustable contracts. Their result suggests that borrowers react rationally to changes in the relative pricing of ARM
and FRM contracts when originating mortgage debt.
2insurance feature of ¯xed-rate mortgages in the presence of direct mail advertising. Our data
come from a large ¯nancial institution (the data are proprietary in nature) that accepted home
equity credit applications from a large number of branch o±ces. Furthermore, we utilize a natural
experiment arising from the bank's marketing campaign that allows us to determine whether an
applicant was exposed to a direct mail solicitation prior to applying for a loan. During the mar-
keting campaign, applicants arrived at the bank's branch locations via one of two methods. First,
applications were accepted at local branches from customers who were not targeted by the bank's
marketing campaign. We refer to these applicants as \walk-in" (WI) customers. Second, the lender
received applications at the branch locations from customers who were targeted with a direct mail
solicitation advertising a home equity product. We refer to these applicants as \direct mail" (DM)
customers. We are able to test the persuasive view versus the informative or complementary view
of advertising by examining the choices of the DM customers relative to the choices made by the WI
customers. If the lender's direct mail campaign is persuasive, then we should observe di®erences
between the DM and WI customers' mortgage choices. However, if the advertising is informative
or complementary, then we should observe DM and WI customers responding similarly to changes
in economic conditions.
Previewing our results, we ¯nd that the WI customers reacted as expected and chose ¯xed-rate
or variable-rate home equity credit products based on the prevailing interest rate and economic
environment at the time of application. That is, WI customers selected the variable-rate product
during periods with higher interest rates. The results from the analysis of the WI customers are
broadly consistent with previous empirical work. However, in comparing product choice across DM
and WI customers, we ¯nd that DM customers do not react as expected to changes in the economic
environment.
Using a variety of empirical methods, we control for possible di®erences between the WI and
DM customers. As a result, we are able to isolate the e®ect of the direct mail solicitation on the
customer's mortgage decision. In particular, we show that consumers who receive a direct mail
solicitation are more likely to ignore the important economic and interest rate environment factors
that in°uenced the decisions of the WI customers. Examining the applicant choices reveals that 78
percent of the DM customers were in°uenced by the bank's solicitation, while 22 percent responded
to signals present in the economic environment. Further analysis of the subset of applicants who
3were clearly in°uenced by the bank's solicitation reveals that 74 percent were persuaded to originate
a product that was opposite to the one selected by their counterparts who did not receive a direct
mail solicitation. However, we also ¯nd that the direct mail solicitation could be classi¯ed as
informative for 26 percent of the DM customers.
In support of our ¯nding that some borrowers were persuaded to make an incorrect product
choice, we ¯nd that the three-month prepayment rate for the persuaded borrowers is almost four
times higher than the corresponding prepayment rates on borrowers who were informed by the
bank's solicitation. Our results are consistent with evidence of consumer learning.10 Thus, while
our study reveals that bank advertising has a persuasive e®ect on consumer ¯nancial decisions for
a majority of the applicants who received a solicitation, we also ¯nd evidence that is consistent
with the informative role of advertising for a smaller subset of consumers.
Finally, we believe that our ¯ndings are not the result of sample selection issues arising from
possible correlation between the customer's decision to respond to the bank's marketing campaign
and the mortgage choice decision. First, we note that the choice of ¯xed-rate or adjustable-rate
debt is a function of borrower expected tenure.11 As a result, we expect that if sample selection is
present it should bias our analysis toward observing a higher probability of selecting the ¯xed-rate
product, weakening the e®ect of a line solicitation and biasing our estimated coe±cients away from
statistical signi¯cance. Second, we ¯nd no di®erences in location patterns between WI and DM
customers. Third, we con¯rm our assertion that sample selection is not a®ecting our results by
estimating a bivariate probit model that jointly captures the customer's decision to respond to the
advertising campaign and the choice of mortgage product. Consistent with our assertion, we ¯nd
that the estimate for the sample selection coe±cient is insigni¯cant. Thus, we do not believe that
sample selection is biasing our ¯ndings of a persuasive advertising e®ect.
The ¯ndings from this study support the growing literature revealing that consumers are
highly in°uenced by the presentation of information that frames ¯nancial decisions. For exam-
ple, Mandrain and Shea (2001) present evidence showing that the design of a ¯rm's retirement
contribution plan has a meaningful impact on the participation choices of employees.12 In another
10See Agarwal et al. (2005).
11See Rosenthal and Zorn (1993) for a discussion of borrower tenure and mortgage choice preferences.
12Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner (2007) also show that the menu of investment options has a signi¯cant impact on
participant portfolio choice.
4example outside of economics, Kressel, Chapman, and Leventhal (2007) demonstrate that the for-
mat of survey questions has a direct impact on an individual's end-of-life treatment choice. In
addition, in an area more closely related to the mortgage choice decision examined in this paper,
Shiller (2008) discusses anecdotal evidence that many subprime borrowers accepted mortgage terms
that were probably not in their best interests, simply because the information about the contract
appeared to come from an expert { such as a ¯nancial institution. Thus, our result indicating that
advertising has a strong in°uence on consumer choice of mortgage product is consistent with this
growing body of evidence showing that the way information is presented or that the way ¯nancial
choices are framed can have a signi¯cant impact on the decision outcome.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we outline the previous theoretical and
empirical studies of borrower mortgage choice and the role of advertising. In Section II, we discuss
the di®erences between home equity lines-of-credit and home equity loans. We describe the data
and empirical method in section III. In section IV, we present the results, and in section V,
we compare the switchers and non-switchers. We provide robustness tests in section VI and we
conclude in section VII.
I Mortgage Choice and the Role of Advertising
In this section we discuss the theoretical motivations for borrower mortgage choice and the role
that lender advertising may play in in°uencing that choice. The theoretical literature on mortgage
choice is well developed and o®ers a number of testable hypotheses. For example, Alm and Follain
(1987) and Brueckner (1986) suggest that borrower risk aversion is a primary factor determining
choice betweeen ARM and FRM. These models indicate that borrowers with low risk aversion and
high discount rates should prefer the higher interest rate risk associated with adjustable contracts,
while borrowers with relatively high risk aversion and/or lower discount rates should prefer ¯xed-
rate contracts. Thus, the trade-o® between ¯xed-rate and adjustable-rate mortgages should depend
upon the prevailing interest rate environment at the time of origination.13
Extending the earlier work on mortgage choice, Brueckner (1993) and Rosenthal and Zorn
(1993) focus on the role that borrower expected mobility plays in determining the selection of
13Empirically, Dhillion, Shilling, and Sirmans (1987) ¯nd that loan pricing factors are the primary determinants of
borrowers choosing ARMs over FRMs in the ¯rst mortgage market.
5adjustable versus ¯xed-rate debt. The comparative statics derived from these models indicate that
the borrower's propensity to choose an adjustable-rate contract is inversely related to her expected
tenure. Furthermore, the comparative statics in Brueckner (1993) also support earlier theoretical
models by indicating that the level of interest rates are inversely related to the attractiveness of
the adjustable-rate debt.
More recently, a number of researchers have recognized the complexity and importance of the
optimal mortgage choice problem within the context of household life-cycle consumption models.
For example, Campbell and Cocco (2003) solve a dynamic model of mortgage choice and consump-
tion assuming that borrower income is risky. Their analysis implies that borrowers with high risk
aversion will prefer ¯xed-rate mortgages and that mortgage choice may reveal unobserved hetero-
geneity in borrower risk pro¯les.14 In addition, Campbell and Cocco's (2003) analysis suggests that
when the yield spread between ¯xed- and adjustable-rate mortgages is large (small), homeowners
should prefer ARMs (FRMs). Empirically, Campbell (2006) con¯rms this result by ¯nding that
the share of ARMs to total mortgage origination is directly proportional to the both the FRM{
ARM interest rate di®erential and the level of the FRM interest rate. In a novel empirical test
that takes advantage of the discontinuity in the U.S. mortgage market resulting from the distinc-
tion between \conforming" and \non-conforming" mortgages, Vickery (2006) ¯nds that borrower
mortgage choices are highly sensitive to changes in FRM interest rates.15 For example, Vickery
(2006) estimates that a 10 basis point increase in ¯xed-rate mortgage rates corresponds to a 10.4
percentage point decline in the FRM market share.16
While the theoretical literature clearly shows that borrower choice of mortgage type should de-
pend upon prevailing ¯nancial conditions at origination, the prior empirical research has relied on
the use of originated loans, necessitating the use of econometric models to infer borrower sensitivity
14See Sa-Aadu and Shilling (1994); Sa-Aadu and Sirmans (1995); and Chiang, Chow, and Liu (2002). In addition,
borrower mobility (see Chan, 1996; and Gabriel and Rosenthal, 1993) and borrower perceptions of default risk (see
Posey and Yavas, 2001) may play a role in contract choice. Recent theoretical work by van Hemert, de Jong, and
Driessen (2005) and van Hemert (2006) also reinforces the link between borrower risk aversion and ARM preference.
15\Conforming" mortgages are loans that are eligible for purchase by the housing government sponsored enterprises
(GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In contrast, \non-conforming" mortgages are ineligible for purchase by the
GSEs. In general, \conforming" mortgages have loan balances below the conforming loan limit (updated annually)
and meet other underwriting risk criteria set by the GSEs.
16Recent work by Koijen, van Hemert, and van Nieuwerburgh (2006) using aggregate ARM/FRM market shares
indicates that the in°ation risk premium and prepayment option value are primary factors in determining ARM
market shares.
6to the interest rate environment.17 Yet, a recent analysis of the home equity lending market by
Agarwal et al. (2008) reveals that lenders can and do alter loan contract terms during the under-
writing process and thus e®ect the observed \choice" of ¯xed-rate versus adjustable-rate contracts.
In this study, we focus on the borrower's initial choice as revealed on the credit application. Thus,
we are able to isolate the factors impacting borrower choice, free of any bias introduced through
subsequent lender screening and underwriting.
While the brief review above demonstrates that borrower mortgage choice has received consid-
erable attention, no study has examined the impact of lender advertising on this choice. Economists
have long considered the e®ect of advertising on consumer behavior. In a recent survey of the pre-
vious century of economic research on advertising, Bagwell (2007) notes that economist generally
view advertising as falling into one of three categories: persuasive, informative, or complementary.
Under the persuasive view, economists assume that \advertising alters consumers' tastes."18 Ac-
cording to the persuasive theory, ¯rms advertise with the goal of altering consumers' preferences
so that they purchase the good or service being advertised.19 Thus, one outcome of persuasive
advertising is that consumers purchase the \wrong" or \incorrect" amount of the product or ser-
vice. In the context of our mortgage choice problem, the persuasive view of advertising suggests
that a lender's direct mail solicitation causes consumers to ignore their evaluation of the economic
environment and thus select the advertised product.
In contrast, the informative view, based on the work of Ozga (1960) and Stigler (1961), concludes
that advertising provides consumers with information and lowers consumer search costs. In the
context of the mortgage choice problem, the informative view of advertising suggests that the
lender's direct mail solicitation provides information to the consumers (for example, reminding them
that attractive interest rates exist on home equity products). As a result, direct mail solicitations
lower search costs but do not alter preferences for a particular product based on the prevailing
economic environment. Under this view, the consumer's choice should coincide with the type of
product advertised in the solicitation.
Finally, the complementary view assumes that consumers' tastes and preferences are stable
17See Brueckner and Follain (1988) for example.
18Bagwell (2007), p. 3.
19Bagwell (2007) documents that the persuasive view developed from early research by Robinson (1933) and
Braithwaite (1928). Bagwell comments that Braithwaite suggested that \advertising's e®ect is to induce consumers
to purchase the wrong quantities of goods that are not well adapted to their true needs..." (p. 10.)
7and advertising complements them to encourage consumption.20 Under this view, the direct mail
solicitation encourages prospective customers to want a home equity product from the lender, but
the choice of product type still re°ects their individual tastes and preferences.
Our study of home equity product choice has the potential to di®erentiate these competing
economic views of advertising. First, if the persuasive view of advertising is correct, then we should
observe the direct mail customers ignoring economic and interest rate environment factors and
selecting the mortgage product suggested in the solicitation. However, if the informative view
is correct, then we should observe the consumer's product choice coinciding with the product
advertised in the solicitation, and this choice should be consistent with our theoretical expectations
for product choice given the economic and interest rate environment prevailing at the time of
application. Finally, if the complementary view is correct, then we should observe the direct mail
customers selecting products in line with the theoretical predictions given the economic and interest
rate environment, without regard to the type of product listed on the solicitation.
Empirically di®erentiating between the three competing views of advertising is di±cult. Thus,
we utilize several independent methods to isolate the e®ect. First, we estimate a direct probabilistic
choice model. Second, we analyze the DM customer who selected products other than the one on
the solicitation. Third, we compare DM customers with a matched sample of WI customers in order
to eliminate any spurious comparisons. Finally, we use information provided by the borrower about
their intended use for the funds to identify borrowers most likely to be informed by the advertising
from those most likely to complemented by it. Each method has advantages and disadvantages.
However, by triangulating the results we can separate the persuasive e®ect of advertising from the
informative and complementary e®ects.
II Di®erences Between Home Equity Lines and Loans
Home equity credit falls into two categories: home equity loans (i.e. \spot" loans) and home equity
lines (i.e. credit lines or lines-of-credit). Agarwal et al. (2006) note that \a spot loan is a closed-
end loan extended for a speci¯ed length of time requiring repayment of interest and principal in
equal monthly installments." The interest rate on home equity loans is set at loan origination. In
20See Bagwell (2007) for a discussion of the development of the complementary view.
8contrast, they de¯ne a credit line as \an open-ended, variable rate, revolving credit facility that
permits the consumer to borrow up to a predetermined amount (the line amount)," and note that
borrowers usually are required to pay interest only on the used portion of the line during the ¯rst
¯ve years, after which the line becomes a fully amortizing loan.
Signi¯cant di®erences exist between borrowers who choose lines versus loans, with line borrow-
ers having greater wealth { as indicated by their having relatively more expensive homes, higher
incomes, and greater home equity. For example, Canner et al. (1998) document that the median
home equity for credit line borrowers is $41,000 greater than spot loan borrowers ($76,000 versus
$35,000) and that the median household income for spot loan borrowers is $10,000 less than the
median household income of credit line borrowers. Canner et al. (1998) also note a signi¯cant
di®erence in the ages of line borrowers and loan borrowers; 23 percent of the loan borrowers versus
6 percent of line borrowers are below the age of 34. In addition, the 1997 Survey of Consumers
shows that 49 percent of the households who prefer loans over lines are relatively more sensitive to
interest rates and that \ease of use" is the primary motivation for credit line borrowers. Thus, it
is imperative to control for borrower heterogeneity in analyzing contract choice.
III Data
As discussed in Agarwal et al. (2007), the data used in this study were provided by a large ¯nancial
institution and consist of variable-rate home-equity lines-of-credit (HELOCs) and ¯xed-rate home-
equity loans (HELs) issued to owner-occupants from March 2002 through December 2002.21 The
credit lines are open for the ¯rst ¯ve years, and the borrower is only required to make interest
payments on the utilized line balance during this period. After the ¯fth year, the line is closed and
is converted to a fully amortizing, ¯xed-rate term loan with a remaining term of ¯ve to 15 years.
The lender received applications from customers via two channels. First, the majority of appli-
cations were from customers walking into their local branch and requesting a home equity credit.
At this point, the local loan o±cer provided the customer with a menu of various home equity
products { with the primary choice being a variable rate (line-of-credit) or ¯xed-rate (loan).22 As
21During the sample period, this institution had operations primarily in the New England, Mid-Atlantic, and
Florida regions and was ranked among the top-¯ve commercial banks and savings institutions by the FDIC.
22Each product also contained a variety of pricing options based on the requested loan-to-value ratio.
9previously mentioned, we refer to these customers as \walk-in" (WI) customers. Between March
2002 and December 2002, the lender received over 108,000 applications by WI customers.
Second, the lender also received applications from customers who had received a direct mail
solicitation advertising either a line-of-credit or home-equity loan. Between March 2002 and May
2002, the bank sent out over 3 million direct mail solicitations in 12 equally distributed waves (or
campaigns) to potential customers (or households) with credit (FICO) scores above 640.23 Across
these 12 campaigns, approximately 2.1 million customers were targeted with a line-of-credit so-
licitation while 981,000 received a home equity loan solicitation. Conditional on maintaining the
approximately two to one ratio of line to loan mailings, the bank randomly selected customers to
receive the line-of-credit or loan o®er.24 That is, the bank did not speci¯cally target individuals for
a line or loan o®er; rather, the bank randomly sent the line and loan mailings to customers with
FICO scores greater than 640.25 Table I shows the mean FICO scores and geographic distribution
of the customers sent the direct mail solicitations. Consistent with the bank's practice of randomly
selecting customers for the two product solicitations, we see that the average FICO scores of the
line and loan groups do not di®er economically.26 Table I also shows the average credit scores and
geographic distribution for the customers that responded to the bank's solicitation. As is typi-
cal in direct mail marketing campaigns, the response rate is low. For example, 20,500 customers
responded to the bank's line-of-credit solicitation for a 0.99 percent response rate and 11,249 cus-
tomers responded to the loan solicitation for a response rate of 1.15 percent. We also see that the
credit scores for responding customers are lower than the credit quality of the population receiving
23In designing the marketing program, the bank requested that the credit bureau provide a random sample of
households in the target area that had credit scores above 640 for the purpose of conducting a direct mail campaign.
By law, the bank cannot request information from the credit bureau and then screen the households again prior to
mailing the solicitation. That is, once the bank pulls a credit score for a household, it is obligated to send that
household a solicitation. The solicitation does not indicate that the households are \pre-approved" for credit. Since
the solicitation is based only on credit score, some households that ultimately respond to the o®er may be denied credit
by the bank based on other household characteristics that are not in line with the bank's underwriting standards.
24We con¯rmed the bank's random assignment of the line-of-credit and loan o®ers through discussions with rep-
resentatives at the bank. Furthermore, we note that the random assignment is consistent with industry practice in
¯nancial product marketing campaigns. For example, Ausubel (1999) reports a similar random assignment of direct
mail solicitations in credit card o®ers.
25The bank's two-to-one targeting of lines-of-credit versus loans likely re°ects the underlying pro¯tability of these
contracts and responses to competitive pressures. For example, Agarwal et al. (2006) show that home equity lines-
of-credit and home equity loans have signi¯cantly di®erent default rates implying substantial di®erences in potential
regulatory capital requirements under Basel II.
26The precision underlying consumer credit scoring models is such that the bank would not distinguish between
borrowers with FICO scores of 729 and 722.
10the solicitation; this is consistent with the experience reported in other consumer loan research.27
Although the customers received a solicitation for a speci¯c product (either a line-of-credit or a
loan), at the time of application the local loan o±cer showed them the same product menu as the
WI customers and they were free to choose either product. Additionally, the solicitation for a line
o®er provided the option for the customer to choose a loan o®er (and vice versa). As previously
mentioned, we refer to the customers who responded to this advertisement as \direct mail" or DM
customers.
Table II shows the descriptive statistics for the DM and WI customer groups. A comparison
of the sample means between the WI and DM customers clearly suggests that the two groups are
di®erent. For example, on average the WI customers have higher estimated home values, greater
income, more job seniority, and longer tenure at the present address. Furthermore, WI customers
request greater loan amounts (consistent with having higher average house values) but lower loan-
to-value ratios. Combining these risk factors suggests that WI loans are lower risk.28
Although the DM and WI customer groups are distinct, the bank did not systematically target
the line or loan solicitation to individuals who were more likely to respond to such solicitations. To
con¯rm this, we report the summary statistics for location (neighborhood) demographic character-
istics in Table III. As we know the zip code for all walk-in customers as well as all recipients of the
bank's direct mail solicitation, we aggregated census tract demographic information from the 2000
census to the zip code level. The columns under \Direct Mail (Mailings)" show the mean values of
the zip codes for all recipients of the bank's solicitation. The columns associated with \Direct Mail
(Response)" show the mean values of the zip codes for the customers who actually responded to
the bank's solicitation. Finally, the columns \Walk-In" show the mean values for the zip codes cor-
responding to the WI customers. If the bank systematically targeted areas based on demographic
27Ausubel (1999) reports a similar result for responses to direct mail credit card solicitations.
28Although it is possible that the WI customers were exposed to the bank's direct mail marketing campaign
through contact with the DM recipients (see Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) or Shiller and Pound (1989) for evidence
of informal information transfer about ¯nancial products), we are unable to control or measure this possibility.
However, if the WI customers did systematically respond to the bank's direct mail campaign via \word-of-mouth"
contact with the DM recipients, then this contamination should bias our analysis away from ¯nding an e®ect for the
advertisement. In our empirical analysis, we use the WI customers as the control group and thus any spill-over from
contact with the DM customers would bias downward our estimates of the direct mail e®ect on the DM customers'
choice. This implies that any positive e®ect may actually be stronger than reported in our analysis. Furthermore,
as part of our process for matching the direct mail customers with the home equity credit application database, we
con¯rmed that the customers identi¯ed as direct mail applicants applied for the credit after the mailing date of the
direct mail solicitation.
11characteristics, then we should see di®erences in the demographic characteristics of the \Direct
Mail (Mailings)" zip codes and the \Walk-In" zip codes. Similarly, if the customers who responded
to the solicitation are concentrated in areas that are demographically distinct, then we should ob-
serve di®erences in the \Direct Mail (Response)" zip codes to both the \Direct Mail (Mailings)"
and \Walk-In" zip codes. Comparing the mean values reported in Table III clearly shows that the
WI and DM customers reside in demographically similar neighborhoods. For example, the median
neighborhood income for persons who received a line-of-credit solicitation is $50,677; the median
neighborhood income for walk-in customers who selected lines-of-credit is $50,597; and the median
neighborhood income for DM customers who received a line-of-credit solicitation and responded
is $50,595. As a result, it does not appear that meaningful systematic di®erences exists in the
neighborhoods of WI and DM customers.
IV Empirical Methods and Results
Our empirical analysis focuses on identifying the e®ect that lender advertising has on ¯nancial
decisions. As discussed previously, identifying advertising's e®ect is challenging. In this section, we
estimate a consumer choice model under the assumption that consumers choose the contract that
maximizes their personal utility function and that this utility is maximized subject to a variety
of economic and personal factors. Analogous to studies that examine the e®ect of various social
programs or medical treatments, we include shift variables that identify consumers who received
direct mail solicitations.
IV.A A Model of Mortgage Choice
We begin by letting Yi represent applicant i's choice of mortgage type, where Y = 1 denotes the
variable rate line-of-credit and Y = 0 is the ¯xed-rate home equity loan. As noted previously, we
also observe that some applicants received a direct mail solicitation from the bank. Our goal is to
determine whether this solicitation had an impact on the applicant's mortgage choice. The classic
approach for this type of problem is to estimate the following probit model of borrower home-equity
12choice:
Pr(Yi = 1) = ¯Xi + ®Ii + "i; (1)
where Xi is a matrix of explanatory variables; Ii = [Iv
i ;I
f
i ]0 with Iv
i equaling one if the applicant
received a direct mail variable-rate line-of-credit solicitation and zero otherwise and I
f
i equaling one
if the applicant received a direct mail ¯xed-rate home equity loan solicitation and zero otherwise;
® = [®v;®f] and ¯ are a set of coe±cients to be estimated; and "i is a standard error term. In (1),
Ii represents a demand shift that isolates the e®ect of the direct mail solicitation on the borrower's
mortgage choice probability.
Estimation of (1) provides an indication of whether receiving a direct mail solicitation a®ects
the mortgage choice decision. However, we are also interested in whether the bank's direct mail
solicitation altered the borrower's sensitivity to factors in the prevailing ¯nancial environment. For
example, prior studies indicate that mortgage choice should depend upon relative borrower risk
aversion and interest rates.29 Thus, we segment Xi into variables representing borrower riskiness
(XR
i ), interest rate environment (XE
i ), and other demographic and geographic factors (XD
i ). By
interacting the direct mail solicitation variables with XR
i and XE
i , we are able to isolate whether
the bank's marketing e®orts altered the applicant's decision process. As a result, we obtain the
following model
Pr(Yi = 1) = ¯Xi + ®Ii + ¼RXR
i Ii + ¼EXE
i Ii + "i; (2)
where ¼R = [¼v
R;¼
f
R]0 and ¼E = [¼v
E;¼
f
E]0. The coe±cients ¼R and ¼E provide an indication of the
impact that the direct mail solicitation had on the applicants evaluation of the economic and risk
factors.
As discussed previously, the persuasive view implies that direct mail customers will ignore eco-
nomic and interest rate factors. Thus, we should observe signi¯cant coe±cients for the advertising
shift parameters with ®v > 0 and ®f < 0 because the solicitation is supposed to alter consumer's
tastes or preferences making them desire the product being advertised, while the interaction terms
29See Alm and Follain (1987) and Brueckner (1986).
13should not be signi¯cant (¼E = ¼R = 0) because the advertising e®ect is assumed to cause con-
sumers to ignore other factors. In contrast, the informative and complementary views imply that
the interaction terms (¼E;¼R) should have the same sign as the base parameters (¯), since infor-
mative advertising does not alter the consumer's underlying preferences.
IV.B Selection Issues
A potential problem associated with the estimation of (2) is that the consumer's response to the
bank's marketing e®ort may not be exogenous. That is, the household's decision to respond to
the o®er may be correlated with the variables in X that impact the mortgage choice decision.
The nature of the correlation arises from the fact that the choice of ¯xed versus adjustable-rate
loans is a function of expected borrower tenure. For example, analysis by Rosenthal and Zorn
(1993) suggests that borrowers with relatively higher expected mobility should prefer adjustable-
rate loans over ¯xed-rate loans. Since our study involves home equity credit (not ¯rst mortgages),
it is reasonable to assume that applicants seeking home equity credit have low expected mobility
{ leading to a high tenure expectation. As a result, home equity credit applicants should have
an unbiased preference for a ¯xed-rate loan, all else being equal. Thus, any bias introduced as a
result of applicant self-selection should be skewed toward observing a higher probability of selecting
the ¯xed-rate product, weakening the e®ect of a line solicitation and biasing our estimate of ®v
downward. As a result, any presence of applicant self-selection should bias the estimated coe±cients
away from our hypothesis that advertising will a®ect consumer choices. Thus, any ¯nding of a
persuasive e®ect from advertising would be stronger than indicated.
In addition, we control for possible sample selection bias by estimating (2) as a bivariate probit
model:
¢i = °Zi + ºi; (3)
Pr(Yi = 1) = ¯Xi + ®Ii + ¼RXR
i Ii + ¼EXE
i Ii + "i; (4)
where (3) re°ects the customer's decision to respond to the bank's direct mail solicitation with ¢i
14equal to one if the customer responded to the direct mail solicitation and zero otherwise, Zi is a
matrix representing the household's credit (FICO) score at the time the bank began the marketing
campaign along with location and campaign ¯xed e®ects, and ºi is a standard error term.30 Equa-
tions (3) and (4) are estimated via full information maximum likelihood where ½ = Cov[ºi;"i]. By
including all hard information captured by the bank's application in Xi and aggregate information
concerning the borrower's speci¯c location (neighborhood) in Zi, the bivariate probit framework
allows us to e®ectively control for potential di®erences between WI and DM customers. However,
as discussed previously, the descriptive statistics reported in Table III con¯rm that no meaningful
di®erences exist at the neighborhood level between the recipients of the bank's solicitation, the
customers who responded to the solicitation, or the walk-in customers.
IV.C Results
Tables IV and V report the estimated coe±cients for the bivariate probit model. First, Table
IV reports the estimated coe±cients for the ¯rst-stage sample selection model. We note that
the estimated coe±cient for the customer credit score at solicitation is negative and signi¯cant,
indicating that o®er recipients with higher credit scores are less likely to respond to the bank's
solicitation. We also include zip code location ¯xed e®ects and campaign ¯xed e®ects to control for
potential di®erences in customer response to the solicitation arising from geographic location and
mailing date.
Table V reports the coe±cients from the second-stage sample selection estimation. The esti-
mated coe±cients con¯rm prior research about the decision to choose between a variable-rate and
¯xed-rate contract. We also note that the sample selection correction parameter (½) is statistically
insigni¯cant.
Given the large number of observations included in the analysis, it is not surprising that almost
all of the estimated coe±cients in Table V are statistically signi¯cant (at the 5 percent level),
with the exception being the interaction of the direct mail dummy variables with the income and
interest rate variables. Thus, we focus on the variables' marginal impacts to provide guidance as
30Because of the time lag between the start of the marketing campaign and the customer's decision to apply for
a home equity product, the customer's credit score may change. We refer to the former as the \Solicitation FICO
Score" and the later as the \Application FICO Score."
15to the relative importance of the factors impacting the borrower's decision.31 Interestingly, only
the estimated coe±cients for interest rates (FRM/ARM rate di®erential and FRM rate level),
the borrowers declared intended use of the funds (consumption or re¯nancing), and direct mail
solicitation have marginal impacts greater than 10 percent.32
IV.C.1 Impact of Borrower's Stated Use of Funds
The borrower's declared use of the debt proceeds clearly has a strong impact on choice of contract.
The marginal impacts indicate that a borrower who intends to use the funds for consumption is
13.2 percent more likely to select the adjustable-rate line-of-credit than a borrower who intends to
use the funds for home improvements. However, a borrower intending to re¯nance existing debt
is 16.8 percent less likely to select the adjustable-rate line-of-credit than a borrower seeking funds
for home improvements. Clearly, borrowers prefer the °exibility associated with the adjustable-
rate line-of-credit when using home-equity to smooth consumption while preferring the certainty
of ¯xed-rate contracts when re¯nancing (or consolidating) existing debt.
IV.C.2 Impact of Interest Rate Environment
We ¯nd that the impact of market interest rates in in°uencing the borrower choice of contract
is consistent with the theoretical predictions of Alm and Follain (1987) and Brueckner (1986) as
well as the previous empirical evidence presented in Brueckner and Follain (1988). For example,
the theoretical literature indicates that borrowers with high relative risk aversion and low discount
rates are more likely to prefer ¯xed-rate contracts. Consistent with this theory regarding borrower
risk aversion, we ¯nd that every one percentage point increase in the di®erence between the ¯xed-
rate and adjustable-rate interest rates results in a 12.4 percent increase in the probability that
31Ai and Norton (2003) point out that the marginal e®ects typically supplied by conventional statistical software
for interaction terms in non-linear models are incorrect. Thus, we follow Ai and Norton (2003) and calculate the























where © represents the standard normal cumulative distribution.
32The \home improvement" intended use is the reference category for the use of funds dummy variables.
16the borrower will select the adjustable-rate contract. Furthermore, every one percentage point
increase in the home equity loan interest rate (the ¯xed-rate product) raises the probability that
the borrower will select the adjustable-rate line-of-credit by 13.3 percent.
To highlight the impact of interest rate movements on borrower contract choice, we estimate the
probabilities of selecting a home equity line-of-credit for two sets of hypothetical borrowers based
on the short term (three months) and long term (¯ve years) daily Treasury rates observed between
January 2003 and December 2004.33 We construct our hypothetical borrowers by assuming that
one set of borrowers are \walk-in" customers (DM = 0) and the other set received a direct mail
solicitation (DM = 1). We further assume that each borrower has values for the other variables
in Xi equal to the sample means. Finally, in each set we assume that one borrower indicated that
she would use the debt proceeds for consumption and that the other would use the debt proceeds
to re¯nance. Based on these values and the estimated coe±cients in Table V, we calculate the
time-varying probabilities that each borrower would select an adjustable-rate line-of-credit.34
To highlight the interest rates used in the simulation, Figure 1 shows the FRM interest rate and
interest rate di®erential between January 2003 and December 2004. Over this period, the ¯xed-rate
reference interest rate varied from 3.1 percent (in June 2003) to over 4.8 percent (in June 2004).
Furthermore, this period saw a decline in the yield curve from 3.1 percent (in May 2004) to 1.3
percent (in December 2004) indicating a substantial drop in short-term interest rates.
Figures 2 and 3 show the probability of selecting an ARM for borrowers with consumption and
re¯nancing motives, respectively. Looking ¯rst at the consumption-motivated borrowers in Figure
2, we see that the probability that the walk-in customer will select the adjustable-rate product
ranges between 54 percent and 77 percent, and closely tracks the FRM interest rate. During
periods when the FRM interest rate is relatively low, the probability of selecting the adjustable-rate
product is correspondingly low { indicating that borrowers are correctly anticipating higher future
rates and thus seek to lock-in the lower current rate. As interest rates increase, the probability of
selecting an adjustable-rate product increases. Comparing the walk-in customers with the direct-
mail customers, one striking observation is the relative interest rate insensitivity of the direct-
mail customers. That is, the probability that a direct-mail customer who received a line-of-credit
33See Brueckner and Follain (1988) for a similar simulation.
34Obviously, the probability of selecting the ¯xed-rate home equity loan is simply one minus the adjustable-rate
probability.
17o®er only varies between 81 percent and 84 percent. Furthermore, for borrowers who received a
solicitation suggesting a home equity loan, the probability of selecting the adjustable-rate product
only varies between 8 percent and 10 percent.
Figure 3 reveals a similar pattern for the borrowers indicating a re¯nancing motive. Again, we
see that the walk-in customers are relatively sensitive to changes in the interest rate environment
with the probability of selecting an adjustable-rate product declining when interest rates are low
and rising after interest rates have moved up. Furthermore, the direct-mail customers who indicated
a re¯nancing motive show a pattern of being relatively insensitive to interest rate movements. this
again is similar to the pattern for consumption-motivated borrowers.
When we compare the changes in ARM selection probability between walk-in customers based on
their indicated use, we ¯nd that borrowers with re¯nancing motives are more sensitive to changes in
the underlying yield curve than borrowers with consumption motives. For example, between March
9, 2004, and May 13, 2004, the FRM benchmark increased from 3.73 percent to 4.85 percent and
the yield curve (interest rate di®erential) increased from 1.72 percent to 3.01 percent. As a result
of this dramatic increase in longer-term interest rates, the probability that a walk-in re¯nancing
borrower would select an adjustable-rate product almost doubled, from 16 percent to 29 percent.
However, during the same period, the probability that a similar consumption-motivated borrower
would select an adjustable-rate product only increased from 62 percent to 77 percent.
IV.C.3 Impact of Bank's Advertising Campaign
We now examine the e®ect of the bank's solicitation on the applicant's mortgage choice. The
marginal e®ects reported in Table V clearly indicate that the bank's direct mail solicitations had
a signi¯cant impact on borrower product choice. After controlling for all other factors, a borrower
receiving a line-of-credit solicitation was 17.7 percent more likely to select a variable rate line-of-
credit than the ¯xed-rate product. Similarly, borrowers who received a direct mail loan o®er were
14.7 percent less likely to select the variable rate product than the ¯xed-rate product. In other
words, the results indicate that ®v > 0 and ®f < 0.
Consistent with the persuasive view, Figures 2 and 3 highlight the impact of the bank's di-
rect mail solicitations and provide evidence that the interaction terms are not signi¯cant. Both
¯gures indicate that WI customers are relatively sensitive to changes in the market interest rate
18environment. In comparison, the estimated probabilities for the customers who responded to the
direct mail solicitation are virtually constant over the entire period. As a result, it does not appear
that the customers who received a direct mail solicitation respond to changes in the economic en-
vironment (as re°ected in movements in interest rates) in a manner that is consistent with the WI
customers. The lack of response for the DM customers to changes in the interest rate environment
is consistent with persuasive view that the advertising caused the customers to ignore other factors.
That is, ¼E = 0 and ¼R = 0.
The results presented here make a compelling case against the informative view of advertising.
Under the informative view, we should observe similar sensitivities to changes in the interest rate
environment for the WI and DM customers. Thus, the relatively constant probabilities of ARM
choice for the DM customers is inconsistent with the informative view and suggests that the lender's
solicitation was persuasive.
The results are less clear for di®erentiating the persuasive e®ect from the complementary e®ect
because of di®erences between re¯nancing-motivated and consumption-motivated borrowers. The
complementary view suggests that we should observe similar probabilities of ARM selection for
the DM customers regardless of the type of solicitation received, since the solicitation is supposed
to remind the customers of the availability of credit but not alter their tastes or preferences for
a particular type of credit. However, the results for the consumption-motivated borrowers do
not support the complementary view. Figure 2 shows that the probability of selecting an ARM
for the consumption-motivated customers who received a loan o®er is signi¯cantly lower than the
corresponding probability for the borrowers who received a line o®er. For the complementary view
to hold, we expect a relatively high probability of selecting an adjustable-rate line-of-credit for
borrowers who intend to use the funds for consumption because interest is only charged on the
amount of credit utilized. Thus, Figure 2 reveals that borrowers who received a home equity loan
solicitation are not only insensitive to interest rate movements, but they also have a low probability
of selecting the adjustable-rate line-of-credit. This ¯nding is inconsistent with the complementary
view of advertising.
In order to refrain from \overselling" our results, however, we note that the results for the
re¯nancing motivated borrowers may be consistent with the complementary view. We expect
that re¯nancing-motivated borrowers should prefer the stability of the ¯xed-rate product when
19consolidating their debts.35 Consistent with this expectation, we see that the probability of selecting
an ARM is almost zero for the re¯nancing customers who received a loan solicitation. We also see
that the probability of selecting an ARM is approximately 30 percent for customers receiving the
line solicitation. However, we note that the WI customers also have an ARM probability averaging
approximately 20 percent. Thus, we cannot state that the solicitation altered the line versus loan
preferences for the re¯nancing customers, since the estimated probability of selecting an ARM for
them is consistent with the estimated probability of selecting an ARM for customers who did not
receive a solicitation. As a result, one could view the results presented in Figure 3 as also being
consistent with the complementary view. However, again, we observe that the lack of sensitivity to
changes in market interest rates for the DM customers is inconsistent with the informative view.
We explore the issue of informative versus persuasive advertising in Section 7.
IV.D Summary
To summarize, our analysis reveals that borrower mortgage choice is sensitive to the economic envi-
ronment. Yet, we also observe that a subset of borrowers who received solicitations or \cues" from
the bank did not select a mortgage product in a manner consistent with theoretical expectations.
Overall, the results suggest that the lender's advertising campaign had a persuasive e®ect.36 In the
next section, we explore the impact of the direct mail solicitation in greater detail by highlighting
the di®erences between borrowers who ignored the lender's direct mail cue and switched to the
alternative product and those who selected the product advertised in the mailing.
35See Canner et al. (1998).
36A natural question arises as to whether the bank's advertising had an \economic" impact on the borrower.
Unfortunately, we are unable to calculate a direct cost. However, we note that ¯xed-rate products have higher
interest rates than variable-rate products, and thus, borrowers who were steered to ¯xed-rate loans but who should
have selected the variable rate product did bear a higher interest cost. As noted above, Greenspan (2004) suggested
that many borrowers may have incorrectly preferred ¯xed-rate products. However, it is also not the case that all
borrowers persuaded to select the variable-rate contract bene¯ted from such steering. Variable-rate products do
expose borrowers to greater future interest rate risk, and as discussed in Section 2, theoretical models show that
¯xed-rate contracts should be preferred by some borrowers depending upon economic and demographic factors. As
a result, borrowers who were persuaded to select the variable-rate line-of-credit were exposed to greater interest
rate risk than appropriate since they should have selected the ¯xed-rate contract as suggested by the theoretical
predictions based upon the prevailing economic conditions at the time of origination.
20V Switchers versus Non-switchers
As discussed above, during the application process, all customers are presented with the full loan
contract menu. Thus, even though the DM customer may have received a solicitation advertising
a line-of-credit, the customer also had the option of applying for a home equity loan. By matching
the database that tracked the customers who received a direct mail solicitation (for either a loan
or line-of-credit) with the database of applications, we can identify instances when the borrower
switched products. For example, if the borrower received a line-of-credit (or loan) solicitation, but
applied for a home equity loan (or line-of-credit), then we classify that borrower as a \switcher."
However, if the borrower received a line-of-credit (loan) solicitation and also applied for a line-of-
credit (loan), then we classify that borrower as a \non-switcher." The presence of switchers raises
an interesting question: Do observable di®erences exist between the switchers and non-switchers?
In other words, can we identify the customers who are more likely to be persuaded by the bank's
solicitation?
Table VI shows the descriptive statistics for the DM customers based on whether the borrower
switched products. We note that out of the 31,749 customers who received a direct mail solicitation,
22 percent selected a product that was di®erent from the one in the solicitation. Furthermore, we
see that 2,375 (21 percent) of the applicants who selected the ¯xed-rate product received a direct
mail o®er for a variable-rate product, while 4,623 (23 percent) of the applicants who selected the
variable-rate product received the ¯xed-rate solicitation.
In order to focus on the explicit di®erences between customers who switched from the solicited
product and those who did not, we estimate a simple logit model for switch versus no switch. Table
VII reports the estimated coe±cients. The results indicate the customers having the characteristics
of being more ¯nancially sophisticated (higher incomes and higher credit scores) are more likely to
switch away from the advertised product. For example, the marginal e®ects imply that a customer
with a FICO score of 774 is 24 percent more likely to switch than a customer with a FICO score
of 724.37 Interestingly, we also see that older customers are less likely to switch than younger
customers. For example, the marginal e®ects indicate that a 56-year-old customer is 33 percent
less likely to switch than a 46-year-old customer.38 This result is consistent with the ¯ndings of
37The mean FICO score for the DM customers is 724.
38The mean customer age at date of application if 46.5 years.
21Agarwal et al. (2007) that ¯nancial sophistication declines with age.
We also see that the customer's indicated intended use of the funds has a direct e®ect on the
probability of switching. For example, borrowers using the loan proceeds for re¯nancing are 2.7
percent more likely to switch, while borrowers using the funds for consumption are 5.6 percent
less likely to switch than borrowers using the funds for home improvements. These results are
consistent with the idea that customers seeking to rate re¯nance are su±ciently sophisticated that
they respond to incentives present in the economic environment and are not persuaded to accept
the o®er presented in the solicitation.
VI Robustness Tests
As a robustness check on the evidence presented above, we analyze the impact of the direct mail
solicitation using a matched sample method. This method requires that we create a matched
sample of WI customers that is statistically similar to the DM customer sample. Since the bank
targets a subsample of the WI population to receive a direct mail solicitation (those with credit
scores greater than 640), our analysis concentrates on the subset of WI customers identical to the
DM customers with the exception that they did not receive a solicitation. In this context, the
direct mail solicitation is the experimental \treatment," and our goal is to assess whether it has
any impact on mortgage choice. Under the null hypothesis that consumers are ¯nancially rational
and choose debt contracts based on the prevailing economic environment, we should not observe a
di®erence in the factors a®ecting the mortgage choice between the two groups.
We begin by matching the 108,117 walk-in consumers to the 31,749 direct mail consumers using
the nearest centroid sorting algorithm (see, Anderberg, 1973, and Hartigan, 1985) based on the
Euclidean distances computed over all demographic and ¯nancial variables within a zip code.39
Once we obtain the probability of the distance to the centroid, we rank order the 108,117 WI
observations and choose the closest 31,749 accounts. Thus, the clustering procedure produces a
sample of WI consumers that matches the DM consumers along these ¯nancial, demographic, and
geographical variables.
39As a robustness check, we also computed the Euclidean distances over a set of ¯ve pre-determined `key' variables.
The sorting algorithm produced an approximately 99 percent overlap between the respective WI subsamples. As a
result, the results reported below are not qualitatively di®erent.
22Table VIII reports the descriptive statistics for the DM customers and the matched WI sample.
It is clear from examining the mean values in Table VIII that the matching algorithm produces
a WI sample that closely resembles the DM customers in terms of credit quality, loan amount,
house value, income, and borrower age. For example, the average FICO scores and loan-to-value
ratios of the two groups are within approximately 1 point of each other, and the di®erence in the
average borrower incomes is about 2 percent ($2,462). To further demonstrate that the nearest
centroid sorting algorithm produced samples that are closely matched on all observable information,
Table IX shows the descriptive statistics for the DM and WI customers based on the type of credit
contract selected. Comparing the mean values for the WI and DM customers based on the selected
product reveals little economic di®erence between the two groups.
VI.A Evaluation of Customer Choice
We estimate separate logit models of borrower choice for the matched walk-in and direct mail
samples. We then compare the marginal e®ects to determine the sensitivity of borrowers to the
independent variables based on whether or not they received a solicitation. E®ectively, this method
is equivalent to estimating a single model over both samples and interacting a dummy variable for
direct mail with each variable.
Table X reports the consumer choice logit model for the matched walk-in sample. Not sur-
prisingly, the results are consistent with the results reported in Table V. The marginal e®ects
indicate that WI borrowers are sensitive to changes in the interest rate environment. For example,
a one point increase in the ¯xed-rate reference interest rate results in a 14.3 percent jump in the
probability that the borrower will select the adjustable-rate line-of-credit. Furthermore, we also
see that the borrower's intended use of funds signi¯cantly impacts their product choice. Borrowers
intending to use the home equity funds for consumption are 12.8 percent more likely to choose the
variable rate line-of-credit, while borrowers indicating that they are re¯nancing existing debt are
20.3 percent more likely to select the ¯xed-rate loan.
Table XI shows the estimated coe±cients and marginal e®ects for the borrower choice model
estimated on the direct mail sample. In contrast to the WI borrowers, we ¯rst notice that none
of the independent ¯nancial and demographic variables have marginal e®ects above 10 percent.
Furthermore, many of the key variables identi¯ed in the WI sample are no longer statistically
23signi¯cant. For example, neither the term structure variable (rate di®erence) or the FRM reference
interest rate are statistically signi¯cant. This result suggests that, in direct contrast to the WI
borrowers, the direct mail customers are not basing their mortgage choice decision on the key
factors identi¯ed by theory.
Comparing the marginal e®ects in Tables X and XI indicates that the intended use of the loan
funds a®ects both the WI and DM customers' choice. However, we see that DM customers' choice
is less sensitive to their stated use of funds. For example, DM borrowers indicating that they are
re¯nancing are 8.3 percent more likely to select the ¯xed-rate product, while the re¯nancing WI
customers are 20.3 percent more likely to select the ¯xed-rate product. Consumption borrowers
also display a similar, but less dramatic, di®erence.
We included the dummy variable Line Solicitation in this model to isolate the impact of the
type of direct mail o®er sent to the customer.40 The marginal e®ect clearly indicates that this
variable has the largest impact on the customer's choice. Customers who receive a line-of-credit
direct mail solicitation are 44.7 percent more likely to select the variable rate line-of-credit than
the ¯xed-rate loan product. The impact of this variable far exceeds the e®ect of any of the other
variables. Thus, it appears that the bank's solicitation even signi¯cantly dampens the e®ect of the
customers' intended use of the funds.
Finally, we examine the choice of borrowers who received a direct mail solicitation, but chose the
product not advertised. Did these customers ignore the bank's direct marketing cue and select the
product consistent with prior theoretical predictions? Table XII reports the results from this model.
Again, we compare the marginal e®ects to the baseline WI customers to identify any di®erences
in sensitivity. The results in table XII clearly indicate that the DM customers who switched are
similar to the WI customers in that they are sensitive to the interest rate environment. The
marginal impact of a one point increase in the yield curve results in an 11.1 percent increase in
the probability that they will select the variable rate product. This result compares favorably with
the 10.3 percent e®ect observed for the WI customers (in Table X). Similarly, we see that a one
point increase in the reference ¯xed-rate mortgage rate increases the probability of selecting the
variable rate product by 8.2 percent (compared with 14.3 percent for the WI customers) in Table
X. Finally, we also note that consumption and re¯nancing motivations have the same e®ects on
40Line Solicitation equals one if the borrower received a variable rate line-of-credit o®er and zero otherwise.
24the DM switching customers as the WI customers. Thus, the results from Table XII are consistent
with the complementary view of advertising. These customers responded to the bank's o®er letter,
but still reacted to the economic environment in selecting the product.
VI.B Persuasive versus Informative Advertising
As noted in Section 5.2, our analysis makes a compelling case that the bank's direct mail solicitation
was largely persuasive and not informative. In this section we explore this distinction in greater
detail. Our objective is to identify the applicants who were persuaded or informed by the bank's
solicitation.
We focus our analysis on the 24,751 customers (78 percent of the direct mail customers) who
selected the product that was advertised (i.e. those who did not switch products) as these were the
individuals most likely to be persuaded or informed by the bank's advertising campaign.41 In order
to determine the product that should have been selected, we use the estimated coe±cients from
the matched walk-in sample model (Table X) to generate a prediction of whether the customer
should select the adjustable-rate or ¯xed-rate product.42 We then compare the customer's model
prediction to their actual selection. Table XIII reports the frequency of persuaded versus informed
consumers. Based on our classi¯cation scheme, we see that 74 percent of the borrowers were
e®ectively \persuaded" by the bank's direct mail solicitation. That is, these borrowers selected the
product that was featured on the solicitation but was opposite the one predicted by the model.
However, we also note that 26 percent of the customers were \informed" by the bank's solicitation,
since they selected the product predicted by the model and it was also featured on the solicitation.
Although the analysis above suggests that 74 percent of the DM customers were persuaded to
select a product that was counter to the one predicted by our model, it is possible that our model has
a high predictive error rate resulting in a large Type II error. Thus, to gain a greater appreciation
for whether model predictive error can explain these results, we examine the model predictive
accuracy using a hold-out sample of customers that were not exposed to the bank's direct mail
solicitation. Recall that the above analysis is based on the borrower choice model for the matched
41By de¯nition, the 6,998 customers who selected the product opposite to the one that was advertised in their
solicitation letter could not have been persuaded. For the advertisement to be persuasive, the customer would have
to select the product that was featured on the solicitation.
42We use a 50 percent cuto® criteria to determine whether the customers should select the adjustable-rate product.
25sample of 31,749 walk-in customers, leaving 76,386 walk-in customers as a defacto hold-out sample.
Thus, by estimating the predicted product choice for the hold-out walk-in customers, we are able
to observe an unbiased estimate of the model's predictive accuracy. Table XIV reports the results
of this test. The results clearly indicate that the model's predictive accuracy (using the 50 percent
cuto® criteria) is very high. Table XIV shows that the model is able to predict the actual product
choice for 85 percent of the customers implying a Type II error rate of 15 percent. In contrast, the
predictive error rate for the direct mail customers is 74 percent. We feel that this is compelling
evidence that the bank's marketing campaign did have a persuasive e®ect.
One concern with our conclusion is that we may be attributing a persuasive e®ect to the bank's
marketing campaign for borrowers who may not care that they selected the \wrong" product
simply because the costs associated with making an \incorrect" decision are trivial. For example,
our analysis could classify borrowers as being \persuaded" even if they originated a line-of-credit in
order to have ready access to funds in the future. These borrowers would clearly not select a ¯xed-
rate product, even if the economic environment pointed to it as the optimal choice, since they would
not be utilizing the funds immediately. In order to test whether this e®ect could be responsible for
our results, table XV shows the average takedown (or utilization) rates at origination, month 12,
and month 24 for the matched WI and DM customers who selected the line-of-credit and actually
originated a loan. If the DM customers viewed the costs associated with the line-of-credit as trivial,
then we would expect to ¯nd their utilization rates substantially lower than the WI customers. The
results clearly reveal that the average utilization rates for WI and DM customers are comparable
and thus do not support the hypothesis that the costs associated with selecting the line-of-credit
are trivial.
As a ¯nal test of whether the advertising was persuasive or informative, we examine the ex
post origination performance of the applications that were actually booked. If the advertising was
persuasive such that it caused borrowers to select the wrong product, then we would expect to
observe these customers learning about their mistake and making adjustments accordingly. To test
for this e®ect, we examine the loan prepayment rates over the three months after origination. The
three month window is a su±ciently short period that exogenous factors (such as changes in interest
rates or household mobility) should have a minimal impact on borrower prepayment decisions. If
the persuaded borrowers learn that they selected the incorrect product, then we should observe a
26higher prepayment rate for these borrowers than for borrowers that we identi¯ed as being informed
or complemented.43
To examine the di®erences in prepayment, we identi¯ed all applications that ultimately resulted
in loans or lines being booked. We note that approximately 89 percent of the DM and WI matched
sample applications resulted in booked loans or lines (28,099 DM customers and 28,256 WI cus-
tomers, respectively). For the customers identi¯ed by our model as being persuaded by the bank's
solicitation, we note that approximately 90 percent of the applications resulted in booked loans
or lines. Similarly, approximately 86 percent and 87 percent of the complemented and informed
customer applications, respectively, resulted in booked loans or lines.
Turning ¯rst to the persuaded customers, we observed that 707 prepaid during the three months
after origination, implying an unconditional prepayment rate of 4.3 percent. In contrast, we ob-
served an unconditional three-month prepayment rate of 2.9 percent for the complemented (switch-
ers) and informed customers.44 In contrast, the unconditional three-month prepayment rate for
the walk-in customers is 1.7 percent.45
Table XVI reports the estimated coe±cients for a simple logistic prepayment model.46 Using
the empirical mortgage performance literature to provide guidance in specifying the independent
variables in the prepayment model, we estimated the following model:
Pr(hi = 1) = ¯Xi + ®Ai + "; (7)
where hi equals one if the mortgage prepays during the three-month period following origination,
and zero otherwise; Xi is a matrix of explanatory variables, Ai = [AP
i ;AI
i;AC
i ]0 with Ak
i (k = P;I;C)
equaling one if borrower i was identi¯ed as being persuaded (P), informed (I), or complemented
(C).47 Following Agarwal et al. (2006), we include in the set of explanatory variables (X), a series
of variables designed to capture the ¯nancial incentives to repay the loan. The variables include the
value of the borrower's prepayment option (OPTION), an indicator of whether the prepayment
43We note again that the home equity loans and lines were \no fee" products. Thus, the borrowers were able to
repay their loans and lines without penalty.
44We observed 172 prepayments out of 6,018 complemented borrowers (or switchers) and 163 prepayments out of
5,619 informed borrowers.
45491 out of the 28,256 walk-in loans booked prepaid within the ¯rst three months after origination.
46Given the short time horizon of our prepayment model, we estimated the prepayment model using a logistic
framework rather than with a hazard rate model.
47The walk-in customers are the reference category.
27option is \in-the-money" (InMoney), and a variable (DSpread) that captures the interaction of
between InMoney and OPTION.48 Not surprising, given that we examine only the three-month
period after origination, none of the ¯nancial variables are signi¯cant, indicating that changes in the
economic environment over the three months after origination did not impact borrower prepayment
behavior. However, consistent with the theory that persuaded borrowers may have recognized that
they selected the \wrong" product, we see that the coe±cient on the variable indicating that the
borrower was persuaded is positive and signi¯cant. The marginal e®ects suggest that the prepay-
ment rate for persuaded borrowers is almost four times as high as the prepayment rate experienced
by the walk-in customers. Furthermore, the coe±cients indicating whether the borrower was in-
formed or complemented are insigni¯cant, suggesting that the three-month prepayment rate for
these borrowers is not statistically di®erent from the prepayment rate for the walk-in customers.
Thus, our analysis shows that the borrowers most likely to have made a mistake by following the
bank's advertising cue (the borrowers identi¯ed as being persuaded) are signi¯cantly more likely
to quickly prepay out of this product than the typical walk-in customer not exposed to the bank's
solicitation.
VII Conclusions
Financial economists now recognize that marketing and persuasion can have important e®ects on
consumer decisions. In this paper, we examine the e®ect of direct mail (or junk mail) advertising
on individual ¯nancial decisions by studying consumer choice of debt contracts.
The results from our analysis suggest that ¯nancial variables underlying the relative pricing
of debt contracts are the leading factors explaining consumer debt choice. Furthermore, we also
¯nd that the intended use of the debt proceeds signi¯cantly a®ects consumer choice. In particular,
we ¯nd that borrowers who intend to use the debt proceeds for consumption are 13 percent more
likely to select the adjustable-rate line-of-credit and borrowers who are re¯nancing existing debt are
approximately 17 percent less likely to choose the adjustable-rate line-of-credit than the borrowers







where Vi is the present value of the remaining mortgage payments at the current market interest rate and V
¤
i is the
present value of the remaining mortgage payments at the contract interest rate.
28who intend to use the funds for home improvements.
With respect to the impact of advertising on borrower choice, we ¯nd evidence that the lender's
advertising campaign had a persuasive e®ect on consumer contract choice. We arrive at this con-
clusion based on a variety of tests. First, coe±cient estimates from a consumer choice model reveal
that receipt of a line-of-credit direct mail solicitation increased the probability of selecting a variable
rate line-of-credit contract by 17.7 percent while receiving the ¯xed-rate loan direct mail solicitation
reduced the odds of selecting the variable rate product by 14.8 percent. Second, analysis based on
a matched sample method reveals that none of the ¯nancial and demographic variables that are
important for the control group's product selection have an impact on the product choice decision
for the direct mail sample. In fact, the customers who received a direct mail line-of-credit solici-
tation are 44.7 percent more likely to select the line-of-credit product than the ¯xed-rate product.
Third, analysis of the product choice model coe±cients for the group of borrowers who ignored the
bank's direct mail solicitation and selected the product not advertised reveals that the key ¯nancial
and demographic variables have the same signs and magnitude as the control group. This ¯nding
suggests that the advertisement had a complementary e®ect for this set of borrowers. Fourth, for
the group of borrowers we identi¯ed as likely being persuaded, we ¯nd that the odds of prepayment
over the three-month period after loan origination is almost four times higher than the prepayment
rate experienced by the control group. Fifth, the estimated coe±cient for the sample selection cor-
rection parameter reveals that borrower self-selection to respond to the bank's advertisement does
not a®ect our analysis. Finally, we also note that a substantial (one-third) portion of the consumers
who received a direct mail solicitation did not view the o®er as persuasive because they remained
sensitive to the economic environment as theory predicts. Thus, the evidence indicates that these
consumers viewed the direct mail advertisement as complementary to their decision-making process.
The results from this study suggest that further research is needed in order to understand
the reactions of individuals to various information cues. For example, in the wake of the on-going
¯nancial crisis in the mortgage and housing markets, banking and consumer regulatory agencies are
exploring the issue of information disclosure in the residential mortgage market.49 Thus, being able
to identify individuals who are most susceptible to ¯nancial advertisements may aid in identifying
49For example, the Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Economics recently held a conference (\Consumer In-
formation and the Mortgage Market," May 29, 2008) in order to explore issues associated with consumer mortgage
knowledge and consumer understanding of mortgage disclosures.
29the type of information that is critical to making informed ¯nancial decisions. Yet, the results
from this study indicate that the responses to bank marketing campaigns vary across individuals,
implying that any regulatory action should re°ect the heterogeneous responses of individuals to
¯nancial information.
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34Table I: Summary Statistics for Direct Mail Customers
Bank Solicitations Consumer Response
Loans Lines Loans Lines
Variables Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
FICO Score 722.6 42.8 729.7 48.6 714.8 37.0 726.8 44.8
State MA 22.7% 30.2% 20.8% 28.6% 24.7% 28.6% 21.0% 27.2%
State CT 10.8% 37.3% 13.0% 33.6% 10.8% 15.7% 14.9% 13.7%
State ME 5.7% 8.7% 6.7% 9.7% 6.1% 6.2% 6.1% 4.9%
State NH 4.4% 20.4% 4.7% 21.2% 5.0% 14.7% 4.4% 14.7%
State NJ 8.4% 27.7% 10.3% 11.2% 7.1% 14.8% 10.7% 7.7%
State NY 35.5% 47.6% 33.0% 37.5% 33.7% 38.5% 30.7% 35.5%
State PA 4.9% 9.6% 4.2% 5.2% 4.5% 4.7% 4.5% 7.5%
State RI 7.2% 25.7% 6.8% 25.0% 6.8% 24.7% 6.9% 17.6%
Frequency .981 Million 2.072 Million 11,249 20,500
Note: This table shows the mean credit scores (FICO) for the recipients of the bank's direct
mail soliciation and the customers who responded to the solicitation. The table also reports the
frequency distribution of mailings and responses by customer location (State).
35Table II: Summary Statistics for Walk-In and Direct Mail Customers
Walk-In Direct Mail
Variables Mean Std Mean Std
Customer LTV 61.88 25.49 70.31 19.98
Appraised LTV 64.68 28.21 71.40 19.08
Borrower Estimated Home Value $329,521 $236,802 $299,334 $221,874
Appraised Home Value $318,491 $202,334 $286,330 $189,785
Requested Loan Amount $66,664 $50,431 $60,291 $40,428
Loan Amount Approved $67,279 $51,631 $61,123 $40,592
APR 5.46 1.06 5.45 1.06
FICO Score 728.02 50.50 724.40 41.03
Debt to Income 38.17 18.99 27.89 14.49
Consumption 30% 42% 28% 42%
Re¯nancing 46% 48% 48% 48%
Years on the Job 7.85 9.01 4.57 2.81
Income $122,241 $160,425 $110,694 $71,919
Borrower Age 46.51 12.57 46.52 11.25
First Mortgage Balance $143,361 $110,230 $132,991 $108,955
Months at Address 99.20 129.26 86.14 26.62
Self Employed 7% 26% 6% 23%
Retired 8% 27% 2% 13%
Home Maker 1% 11% 1% 10%
Married 53% 50% 48% 50%
Frequency 108,117 31,749
Note: Customer LTV is the loan-to-value ratio based on the requested loan amount and the bor-
rower's self-reported house value. Appraised LTV is the bank's loan-to-value ratio based on the
approved loan amount and independent property appraisal. APR is the e®ective contract interest
rate on the loan product selected. FICO is the borrower's credit quality score at application; Debt-
to-income is the ratio of the borrower's debt to total income; Income is the borrower's income at
date of application; Consumption is a dummy variable indicating that the borrower intends to use
the loan/line proceeds for consumption purposes; Re¯nancing is a dummy variable indicating that
the borrower is using the loan/line proceeds to re¯nance existing debt; Self Employed, Retired,





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































37Table IV: First-Stage Sample Selection Model
Coe±cient Standard Marginal
Value Error P-value Impact
Intercept -0.5381 0.0194 <.0001
Solicitation FICO Score -0.0005 0.0002 0.0271 -0.01%
Zip Code Fixed E®ects Yes
Campaign Fixed E®ects Yes
Number of Observations 3.01 Million
Pseudo-Rsq 17.92%
Notes: This table reports the maximum-likelihood parameter estimates for the ¯rst-stage bivariate
probit model of whether the household responded to the direct mail solicitation. The dependent
variable in is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household responded to the solicitation and 0
otherwise. The independent variable, FICO, is the borrower's credit quality score at the time of
the bank's solicitation. The Standard Errors are corrected for Heteroskadisticity.
38Table V: Second Stage Bivariate Probit Model of Borrower Home-Equity Choice
Coe®. Standard Marginal
Value Error P-value Impact
Intercept -8.2318 0.2565 <.0001
Economic Environment Variables:
Rate Di®erence (FRM% - ARM%) 0.3542 0.0179 <.0001 12.37%
FRM APR% 0.2245 0.0193 <.0001 13.25%
Loan-to-Value Variables:
Ln(Borrower Estimate of the House Value) 0.0053 0.0017 <.0001 1.43%
Ln(Loan Amount Requested) 0.0046 0.0007 <.0001 1.56%
Borrower State Use of Funds:
Consumption 1.1023 0.0239 <.0001 13.17%
Re¯nancing -0.9851 0.0206 <.0001 -16.76%
Borrower Characteristics:
Application FICO 0.0063 0.0002 <.0001 0.04%
Debt to Income -0.0147 0.0005 <.0001 -0.03%
Ln(Income) 0.0659 0.0187 0.0005 6.12%
Borrower Age 0.0010 0.0008 <.0001 0.18%
Years on the Job 0.0539 0.0009 <.0001 0.31%
Ln(First Mortgage Balance) 0.0657 0.0110 <.0001 4.84%
Ln(Months at Address) 0.0272 0.0081 0.0006 4.85%
Self Employed 0.4025 0.0333 <.0001 2.27%
Retired -0.4191 0.0429 <.0001 -0.97%
Home Maker -0.3379 0.0685 <.0001 -0.32%
Married -0.1686 0.0163 <.0001 -1.96%
Direct Mail Solicitation E®ects:
DM Line O®er Dummy 0.2264 0.0556 <.0001 17.74%
DM Loan O®er Dummy -0.2122 0.0359 <.0001 -14.67%
DM Line * FICO Score 0.0026 0.0005 <.0001 0.03%
DM Loan * FICO Score -0.0036 0.0005 <.0001 -0.05%
DM Lines * Log(Income) 0.0049 0.0437 0.9418 0.02%
DM Loans * Log(Income) -0.0058 0.0730 0.9940 -0.01%
DM Line * Rate Di®erence -0.2102 0.1969 0.5830 -0.01%
DM Loan * Rate Di®erence -0.1934 0.5202 0.8971 -0.02%
DM Line * FRM APR % -0.2633 0.5337 0.9360 -0.01%
DM Loan * FRM APR% -0.2097 0.2722 0.4780 -0.02%
DM Line * Consumption 0.1993 0.0678 <.0001 6.83%
DM Loan * Consumption 0.4709 0.1942 0.0058 1.10%
DM Line * Re¯nancing -0.1085 0.0441 0.0291 -1.90%
DM Loan * Re¯nancing -0.3333 0.0878 <.0001 -6.92%
½ -0.4251 0.2926 0.2714
Month Loan Application Dummies Yes
State Location Control Dummies Yes
Number of Observations 139,866
Pseudo R-sq 24.82%
Notes: This table reports the maximum-likelihood parameter estimates for the bivariate probit model of borrower home-equity
choice. The dependent variable equals one if the borrower selected a variable rate line-of-credit and zero otherwise. Application
FICO is the borrower's credit quality score at application; Rate Di®erence is the di®erence between the home-equity loan interest
rate and the home-equity line-of-credit interest rate prevailing at the time of application; FRM APR is the ¯xed-rate home
equity loan interest rate; Debt-to-income is the ratio of the borrower's debt to total income; Income is the borrower's income
at date of application; Consumption is a dummy variable indicating that the borrower intends to use the loan/line proceeds
for consumption purposes; Re¯nancing is a dummy variable indicating that the borrower is using the loan/line proceeds to
re¯nance existing debt; Self Employed, Retired, Home Maker, and Married are dummy variables indicating the borrower's
respective employment and marriage status. Following Ai and Norton (2003), the marginal e®ects for the interaction variables








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































40Table VII: Analysis of Decision to Switch Away from Product O®ered in Direct Mail
Solicitation
Coe®. Val. Std. Err. P-value Marg Impact
Intercept 8.2849 0.0701 <.0001
Loan-to-Value Variables:
Ln(Borrower Estimate of the House Value) -0.0040 0.0006 <.0001 1.45%
Ln(Loan Amount Requested) 0.0020 0.0004 <.0001 0.10%
Borrower Stated Use of Funds:
Consumption -0.2410 0.0450 <.0001 -5.64%
Re¯nancing 0.0042 0.0141 0.7722 2.71%
Borrower Characteristics:
FICO 0.0209 0.0014 <.0001 0.48%
Debt to Income -0.0238 0.0026 <.0001 0.00%
Ln(Income) 0.0220 0.0098 0.0258 2.07%
Borrower Age -0.1259 0.0123 <.0001 -3.29%
Years on the Job 0.3505 0.0109 <.0001 0.10%
Ln(First Mortgage Balance) -0.0132 0.0095 0.1694 -1.97%
Ln(Months at Address) -0.1035 0.0080 <.0001 -0.63%
Self Employed -0.0744 0.0024 <.0001 -0.04%
Retired -0.0382 0.0050 <.0001 -0.17%
Home Maker -0.0006 0.0002 0.0002 -0.06%
Married 1.4110 0.0076 <.0001 0.00%
Month Loan Origination Dummies Yes
State Location Control Dummies Yes
Number of Observations 31,749
Pseudo R-sq 7.93%
Notes: This table reports the maximum-likelihood parameter estimates for the logit model of
whether the customer selected the alternative product from the one contained in the direct mail
solicitation. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the customer switched
and 0 otherwise. FICO is the borrower's credit quality score at application; Debt-to-income is
the ratio of the borrower's debt to total income; Income is the borrower's income at date of
application; Consumption is a dummy variable indicating that the borrower intends to use the
loan/line proceeds for consumption purposes; Re¯nancing is a dummy variable indicating that the
borrower is using the loan/line proceeds to re¯nance existing debt; Self Employed, Retired, Home
Maker, and Married are dummy variables indicating the borrower's respective employment and
marriage status.
41Table VIII: Summary Statistics for the Matched Sample Walk-In (WI) and Direct Mail
(DM) Customers
Walk-In Direct Mail
Variables Mean Std Mean Std
Customer LTV 71.36 24.16 70.31 19.98
Appraised LTV 72.37 26.45 71.40 19.08
Borrower Estimated Home Value $293,693 $137,769 $299,334 $221,874
Appraised Home Value $282,975 $155,315 $286,330 $189,785
Requested Loan Amount $57,038 $19,188 $60,291 $40,428
Loan Amount Approved $57,927 $17,540 $61,123 $40,592
APR 5.87 1.16 5.45 1.06
FICO Score 722.80 39.35 724.40 41.03
Debt to Income 31.34 20.27 27.89 14.49
Consumption 26% 40% 28% 42%
Re¯nancing 50% 47% 48% 48%
Years on the Job 4.41 7.77 4.57 2.81
Income $112,335 $70,896 $110,694 $71,919
Borrower Age 47.24 11.40 46.52 11.25
First Mortgage Balance $127,492 $68,007 $132,991 $108,955
Months at Address 87.59 110.17 86.14 26.62
Self Employed 7% 25% 6% 23%
Retired 5% 21% 2% 13%
Home Maker 1% 9% 1% 10%
Married 50% 50% 48% 50%
Frequency 31749 31749
Note: The walk-in sample was created using the nearest centroid sorting algorithm based on the
Euclidean distances computed over all demographic and ¯nancial variables within a zip code. Cus-
tomer LTV is the loan-to-value ratio based on the requested loan amount and the borrower's
self-reported house value. Appraised LTV is the bank's loan-to-value ratio based on the approved
loan amount and independent property appraisal. APR is the e®ective contract interest rate on the
loan product selected. FICO is the borrower's credit quality score at application; Debt-to-income
is the ratio of the borrower's debt to total income; Income is the borrower's income at date of appli-
cation; Consumption is a dummy variable indicating that the borrower intends to use the loan/line
proceeds for consumption purposes; Re¯nancing is a dummy variable indicating that the borrower
is using the loan/line proceeds to re¯nance existing debt; Self Employed, Retired, Home Maker,






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































43Table X: Consumer Choice Between Fixed- and Adjustable-Rate Home Equity
Walk-In Consumers
Coe®. Val. Std. Err. P-value Marg Impact
Intercept -9.6807 1.4173 <.0001
Economic Environment Variables:
Rate Di®erence (FRM% - ARM%) 0.3060 0.0472 <.0001 10.34%
FRM APR% 0.1365 0.0246 <.0001 14.29%
Loan-to-Value Variables:
Ln(Borrower Estimate of the House Value) 0.0024 0.0002 <.0001 1.92%
Ln(Loan Amount Requested) 0.0014 0.0002 <.0001 1.79%
Borrower Stated Use of Funds:
Consumption 0.8121 0.0896 <.0001 12.80%
Re¯nancing -1.2050 0.0630 <.0001 -20.26%
Borrower Characteristics:
FICO 0.0062 0.0007 <.0001 0.06%
Debt to Income -0.0167 0.0020 <.0001 -0.04%
Ln(Income) 0.0748 0.0184 <.0001 8.73%
Borrower Age 0.0036 0.0012 <.0001 0.28%
Years on the Job 0.0205 0.0032 <.0001 0.26%
Ln(First Mortgage Balance) 0.1943 0.0415 <.0001 6.87%
Ln(Months at Address) 0.2090 0.0293 <.0001 4.99%
Self Employed 0.0468 0.0879 0.8905 3.90%
Retired -0.3269 0.1487 0.0173 -1.44%
Home Maker -0.1392 0.0326 <.0001 -0.43%
Married -0.2489 0.0554 <.0001 -1.69%
Month Loan Origination Dummies Yes
State Location Control Dummies Yes
Number of Observations 31,749
Pseudo R-sq 12.39%
Notes: This table reports the maximum-likelihood parameter estimates for the logit model of
whether the customer selected the adjustable-rate product. The model is estimated using the
matched sample walk-in customers. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the WI customer selected the ARM and 0 otherwise. FICO is the borrower's credit quality score
at application; Debt-to-income is the ratio of the borrower's debt to total income; Income is the
borrower's income at date of application; Consumption is a dummy variable indicating that the
borrower intends to use the loan/line proceeds for consumption purposes; Re¯nancing is a dummy
variable indicating that the borrower is using the loan/line proceeds to re¯nance existing debt;
Self Employed, Retired, Home Maker, and Married are dummy variables indicating the borrower's
respective employment and marriage status.
44Table XI: Consumer Choice Between Fixed- and Adjustable-Rate Home Equity
Direct Mail Consumers
Coe®. Val. Std. Err. P-value Marg Impact
Intercept -4.0226 0.5145 <.0001
Economic Environment Variables:
Rate Di®erence (FRM% - ARM%) -0.0784 0.3229 0.8684 -1.65%
FRM APR% -0.1026 0.1480 0.5548 -0.92%
Loan-to-Value Variables:
Ln(Borrower Estimate of the House Value) 0.0022 0.0008 <.0001 1.68%
Ln(Loan Amount Requested) 0.0024 0.0003 <.0001 1.24%
Borrower Stated Use of Funds:
Consumption 1.0304 0.0889 <.0001 8.78%
Re¯nancing -0.7038 0.0429 <.0001 -8.25%
Borrower Characteristics:
FICO 0.0013 0.0005 <.0001 0.04%
Debt to Income -0.0262 0.0022 <.0001 -0.04%
Ln(Income) 0.3434 0.0870 0.0001 3.87%
Borrower Age 0.0048 0.0020 0.0119 0.27%
Years on the Job 0.0092 0.0060 0.1879 0.38%
Ln(First Mortgage Balance) 0.0719 0.0335 0.0277 5.68%
Ln(Months at Address) 0.0338 0.0028 <.0001 3.94%
Self Employed 0.2672 0.0713 <.0001 1.27%
Retired -0.6141 0.1268 <.0001 -1.25%
Home Maker -0.0615 0.0320 0.0399 -0.22%
Married -0.1176 0.0705 0.0843 -0.85%
Direct Mail Solicitation E®ects:
Line Solicitation 2.1426 0.5740 <.0001 44.71%
Month Loan Origination Dummies Yes
State Location Control Dummies Yes
Number of Observations 31,749
Pseudo R-sq 10.37%
Notes: This table reports the maximum-likelihood parameter estimates for the logit model of
whether the Direct Mail customer selected the adjustable-rate product. The dependent variable
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the DM customer selected the ARM and 0 otherwise. FICO
is the borrower's credit quality score at application; Debt-to-income is the ratio of the borrower's
debt to total income; Income is the borrower's income at date of application; Consumption is a
dummy variable indicating that the borrower intends to use the loan/line proceeds for consumption
purposes; Re¯nancing is a dummy variable indicating that the borrower is using the loan/line
proceeds to re¯nance existing debt; Self Employed, Retired, Home Maker, and Married are dummy
variables indicating the borrower's respective employment and marriage status. Line Solicitation
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the customer received a line-of-credit o®er and 0 otherwise.
45Table XII: Consumer Choice Between Fixed- and Adjustable-Rate Home Equity
Direct Mail Switchers
Coe®. Val. Std. Err. P-value Marg Impact
Intercept -5.0475 1.5669 <.0001
Economic Environment Variables:
Rate Di®erence (FRM% - ARM%) 0.2707 0.0476 <.0001 11.10%
FRM APR% 0.1385 0.0131 <.0001 8.15%
Loan-to-Value Variables:
Ln(Borrower Estimate of the House Value) 0.0062 0.0002 <.0001 2.01%
Ln(Loan Amount Requested) 0.0039 0.0001 0.0203 1.09%
Borrower Stated Use of Funds:
Consumption 1.1114 0.1131 <.0001 10.49%
Re¯nancing -0.7210 0.0553 <.0001 -12.20%
Borrower Characteristics:
FICO 0.0015 0.0006 <.0001 0.02%
Debt to Income -0.0288 0.0027 <.0001 -0.03%
Ln(Income) 0.1969 0.0525 <.0001 4.05%
Borrower Age 0.0041 0.0025 0.0972 0.11%
Years on the Job 0.0164 0.0077 0.0192 0.13%
Ln(First Mortgage Balance) 0.0866 0.0373 0.0243 2.06%
Ln(Months at Address) 0.0028 0.0008 <.0001 0.94%
Self Employed 0.0093 0.0849 0.9333 0.29%
Retired -0.4596 0.1854 0.0147 -1.31%
Home Maker -0.1987 0.1987 0.4028 -0.24%
Married -0.0636 0.0859 0.5821 -0.24%
Month Loan Origination Dummies Yes
State Location Control Dummies Yes
Number of Observations 6,998
Pseudo R-sq 18.92%
Notes: This table reports the maximum-likelihood parameter estimates for the logit model of
whether the Direct Mail customers who switched products selected the adjustable-rate product.
The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the DM `switch' customer selected the
ARM and 0 otherwise. FICO is the borrower's credit quality score at application; Debt-to-income
is the ratio of the borrower's debt to total income; Income is the borrower's income at date of
application; Consumption is a dummy variable indicating that the borrower intends to use the
loan/line proceeds for consumption purposes; Re¯nancing is a dummy variable indicating that the
borrower is using the loan/line proceeds to re¯nance existing debt; Self Employed, Retired, Home
Maker, and Married are dummy variables indicating the borrower's respective employment and
marriage status.
46Table XIII: Analysis of Persuaded versus Informed Consumers
Number Predicted FRM Predicted ARM
Mailed Selected FRM Selected ARM Selected FRM Selected ARM
Mailed ARM 15,877 ¢ ¢ ¢ 12,336 ¢ ¢ ¢ 3,541
50% 14%
Mailed FRM 8,874 2,918 ¢ ¢ ¢ 5,956 ¢ ¢ ¢
12% 24%
Notes: This table reports the frequency of customers identi¯ed as either persuaded or informed.
For all direct mail borrowers who did not switch products, we estimated the predicted product that
they should select based on the coe±cients from the walk-in mortgage choice model (Table X). We
then compare the predicted choice to the actual choice based on whether the borrower received
an adjustable-rate (ARM) or ¯xed-rate (FRM) solicitation. The persuaded borrowers selected the
product opposite to the one predicted and are noted in bold. Informed borrowers selected the
product that is consistent with the one predicted and are noted in italics. Borrowers following into
the (¢ ¢ ¢) cells selected the predicted product and thus ignored the bank's advertising.
Table XIV: Walk-in Customer Prediction Error Rate
Predicted Selection
Actual Selection ARM FRM Total
ARM 48,345 8,167 56,512
85.5% 14.5%
FRM 3,056 16,800 19,856
15.4% 84.6%
Total 51,401 24,967 76,386
Notes: This table reports the predicted walk-in customer selection error rate. For all walk-in
customers who were not included in the matched-sample analysis, we estimated the predicted
product that they should select based on the coe±cients from the matched sample walk-in mortgage
choice model (Table X). We then compare the predicted choice to the actual choice. E®ectively,
this test provides an indication of the predictive accuracy of the estimated mortgage choice model
using a hold-out sample.
Table XV: Average Line-Of-Credit Takedown Rate
Month 0 Month 12 Month 24
Walk-in 58.9% 63.2% 67.1%
Direct Mail 60.3% 63.7% 66.0%
Notes: This table reports the average line-of-credit takedown (utilization) rate at origination, month
12, and month 24. The utilization rate is the amount of funds drawn expressed as a percent of
total credit line available.
47Table XVI: Prepayment Behavior of Home Equity Loans and Lines
Coe®. Standard Marginal
Value Error t-stat E®ects
Intercept -3.1833 0.3723 -8.55
Log(FICO) 0.1844 0.1373 1.34 1.828
LTV 0.0318 0.0388 0.82 0.187
OPTION 0.0184 0.0178 1.03 0.384
InMoney -0.0311 0.1346 -0.23 -0.157
DSpread 0.0188 0.0691 0.27 0.066
Persuaded 0.4831 0.1839 2.63 3.992
Informed 0.1758 0.1592 1.10 0.950





Number of Observations 56,355
Pseudo R-sq 0.0173
Note: This table reports the maximum-likelihood parameter estimates for the logistic three-month
prepayment model. The dependent variable equals one if the borrower prepaid the mortgage during
the three month period following origination and zero otherwise. FICO is hte borrower's credit
quality score at application; LTV is the loan-to-value ratio at application; OPTION is the value
of the borrower's prepayment option re°ecting the di®erence between the market rate of interest
and the contract interest rate; InMoney indicates whether the prepayment option is `in-the-money';
DSpread is the interaction of InMoney and Option; Persuaded, Informed, and Complemented are
indicator variables denoting whether the borrower was persuaded, informed or complemented by
the bank's direct mail solicitation (walk-in customers are the reference category.) Standard Errors































































































































P(ARM - Consumption WI) P(ARM - Consumption DM Line Offer)
P(ARM - Consumption DM Loan Offer)
Figure 2: Probability of Choosing an ARM for Consumption Motive Borrowers with





































































































P(ARM - Refinancing WI) P(ARM - Refinancing DM Line Offer)
P(ARM - Refinancing DM Loan Offer)
Figure 3: Probability of Choosing an ARM for Re¯nancing Borrowers with varying
FRM APR and Rate Di®erence
511 
Working Paper Series 
 
A series of research studies on regional economic issues relating to the Seventh Federal 
Reserve District, and on financial and economic topics. 
 
Firm-Specific Capital, Nominal Rigidities and the Business Cycle  WP-05-01 
David Altig, Lawrence J. Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum and Jesper Linde 
 
Do Returns to Schooling Differ by Race and Ethnicity?  WP-05-02 
Lisa Barrow and Cecilia Elena Rouse 
 
Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Netting, Collateral, and Closeout  WP-05-03 
Robert R. Bliss and George G. Kaufman 
 
Risk Overhang and Loan Portfolio Decisions  WP-05-04 
Robert DeYoung, Anne Gron and Andrew Winton 
 
Characterizations in a random record model with a non-identically distributed initial record  WP-05-05 
Gadi Barlevy and H. N. Nagaraja 
 
Price discovery in a market under stress: the U.S. Treasury market in fall 1998  WP-05-06 
Craig H. Furfine and Eli M. Remolona 
 
Politics and Efficiency of Separating Capital and Ordinary Government Budgets  WP-05-07 
Marco Bassetto with Thomas J. Sargent 
 
Rigid Prices: Evidence from U.S. Scanner Data  WP-05-08 
Jeffrey R. Campbell and Benjamin Eden 
 
Entrepreneurship, Frictions, and Wealth  WP-05-09 
Marco Cagetti and Mariacristina De Nardi 
 
Wealth inequality: data and models  WP-05-10 
Marco Cagetti and Mariacristina De Nardi 
 
What Determines Bilateral Trade Flows?  WP-05-11 
Marianne Baxter and Michael A. Kouparitsas 
 
Intergenerational Economic Mobility in the U.S., 1940 to 2000  WP-05-12 
Daniel Aaronson and Bhashkar Mazumder  
 
Differential Mortality, Uncertain Medical Expenses, and the Saving of Elderly Singles  WP-05-13 
Mariacristina De Nardi, Eric French, and John Bailey Jones 
 
Fixed Term Employment Contracts in an Equilibrium Search Model  WP-05-14 
Fernando Alvarez and Marcelo Veracierto 
 2 
Working Paper Series (continued)  
 
Causality, Causality, Causality: The View of Education Inputs and Outputs from Economics  WP-05-15 
Lisa Barrow and Cecilia Elena Rouse 
 
Competition in Large Markets  WP-05-16 
Jeffrey R. Campbell 
 
Why Do Firms Go Public?  Evidence from the Banking Industry  WP-05-17 
Richard J. Rosen, Scott B. Smart and Chad J. Zutter 
 
Clustering of Auto Supplier Plants in the U.S.: GMM Spatial Logit for Large Samples  WP-05-18 
Thomas Klier and Daniel P. McMillen 
 
Why are Immigrants’ Incarceration Rates So Low? 
Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation  WP-05-19 
Kristin F. Butcher and Anne Morrison Piehl 
 
Constructing the Chicago Fed Income Based Economic Index – Consumer Price Index:  
Inflation Experiences by Demographic Group: 1983-2005  WP-05-20 
Leslie McGranahan and Anna Paulson 
 
Universal Access, Cost Recovery, and Payment Services  WP-05-21 
Sujit Chakravorti, Jeffery W. Gunther, and Robert R. Moore 
 
Supplier Switching and Outsourcing  WP-05-22 
Yukako Ono and Victor Stango 
 
Do Enclaves Matter in Immigrants’ Self-Employment Decision?  WP-05-23 
Maude Toussaint-Comeau 
 
The Changing Pattern of Wage Growth for Low Skilled Workers  WP-05-24 
Eric French, Bhashkar Mazumder and Christopher Taber 
 
U.S. Corporate and Bank Insolvency Regimes: An Economic Comparison and Evaluation  WP-06-01 
Robert R. Bliss and George G. Kaufman 
 
Redistribution, Taxes, and the Median Voter  WP-06-02 
Marco Bassetto and Jess Benhabib 
 
Identification of Search Models with Initial Condition Problems  WP-06-03 
Gadi Barlevy and H. N. Nagaraja 
 
Tax Riots  WP-06-04 
Marco Bassetto and Christopher Phelan 
 
The Tradeoff between Mortgage Prepayments and Tax-Deferred Retirement Savings  WP-06-05 
Gene Amromin, Jennifer Huang,and Clemens Sialm 3 
Working Paper Series (continued)  
 
Why are safeguards needed in a trade agreement?  WP-06-06 
Meredith A. Crowley 
 
Taxation, Entrepreneurship, and Wealth  WP-06-07 
Marco Cagetti and Mariacristina De Nardi 
 
A New Social Compact: How University Engagement Can Fuel Innovation  WP-06-08 
Laura Melle, Larry Isaak, and Richard Mattoon  
 
Mergers and Risk  WP-06-09 
Craig H. Furfine and Richard J. Rosen 
 
Two Flaws in Business Cycle Accounting  WP-06-10 
Lawrence J. Christiano and Joshua M. Davis 
 
Do Consumers Choose the Right Credit Contracts?  WP-06-11 
Sumit Agarwal, Souphala Chomsisengphet, Chunlin Liu, and Nicholas S. Souleles 
 
Chronicles of a Deflation Unforetold  WP-06-12 
François R. Velde 
 
Female Offenders Use of Social Welfare Programs Before and After Jail and Prison: 
Does Prison Cause Welfare Dependency?  WP-06-13 
Kristin F. Butcher and Robert J. LaLonde 
 
Eat or Be Eaten: A Theory of Mergers and Firm Size  WP-06-14 
Gary Gorton, Matthias Kahl, and Richard Rosen 
 
Do Bonds Span Volatility Risk in the U.S. Treasury Market? 
A Specification Test for Affine Term Structure Models  WP-06-15 
Torben G. Andersen and Luca Benzoni 
 
Transforming Payment Choices by Doubling Fees on the Illinois Tollway  WP-06-16 
Gene Amromin, Carrie Jankowski, and Richard D. Porter 
 
How Did the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut Affect Stock Prices?  WP-06-17 
Gene Amromin, Paul Harrison, and Steven Sharpe 
 
Will Writing and Bequest Motives: Early 20th Century Irish Evidence  WP-06-18 
Leslie McGranahan 
 
How Professional Forecasters View Shocks to GDP  WP-06-19 
Spencer D. Krane 
 
Evolving Agglomeration in the U.S. auto supplier industry  WP-06-20 
Thomas Klier and Daniel P. McMillen 
 4 
Working Paper Series (continued)  
 
Mortality, Mass-Layoffs, and Career Outcomes: An Analysis using Administrative Data  WP-06-21 
Daniel Sullivan and Till von Wachter 
 
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures:  
Tying One’s Hand through the WTO.  WP-06-22 
Meredith A. Crowley 
 
How Did Schooling Laws Improve Long-Term Health and Lower Mortality?  WP-06-23 
Bhashkar Mazumder 
 
Manufacturing Plants’ Use of Temporary Workers: An Analysis Using Census Micro Data  WP-06-24 
Yukako Ono and Daniel Sullivan 
 
What Can We Learn about Financial Access from U.S. Immigrants?  WP-06-25 
Una Okonkwo Osili and Anna Paulson 
 
Bank Imputed Interest Rates: Unbiased Estimates of Offered Rates?  WP-06-26 
Evren Ors and Tara Rice 
 
Welfare Implications of the Transition to High Household Debt  WP-06-27 
Jeffrey R. Campbell and Zvi Hercowitz 
 
Last-In First-Out Oligopoly Dynamics  WP-06-28 
Jaap H. Abbring and Jeffrey R. Campbell 
 
Oligopoly Dynamics with Barriers to Entry  WP-06-29 
Jaap H. Abbring and Jeffrey R. Campbell 
 
Risk Taking and the Quality of Informal Insurance: Gambling and Remittances in Thailand  WP-07-01 
Douglas L. Miller and Anna L. Paulson 
 
Fast Micro and Slow Macro: Can Aggregation Explain the Persistence of Inflation?  WP-07-02 
Filippo Altissimo, Benoît Mojon, and Paolo Zaffaroni 
 
Assessing a Decade of Interstate Bank Branching  WP-07-03 
Christian Johnson and Tara Rice 
 
Debit Card and Cash Usage: A Cross-Country Analysis  WP-07-04 
Gene Amromin and Sujit Chakravorti 
 
The Age of Reason: Financial Decisions Over the Lifecycle  WP-07-05 
Sumit Agarwal, John C. Driscoll, Xavier Gabaix, and David Laibson 
 
Information Acquisition in Financial Markets: a Correction  WP-07-06 
Gadi Barlevy and Pietro Veronesi 
 
Monetary Policy, Output Composition and the Great Moderation  WP-07-07 
Benoît Mojon 
 5 
Working Paper Series (continued) 
 
Estate Taxation, Entrepreneurship, and Wealth  WP-07-08 
Marco Cagetti and Mariacristina De Nardi 
 
Conflict of Interest and Certification in the U.S. IPO Market  WP-07-09 
Luca Benzoni and Carola Schenone 
 
The Reaction of Consumer Spending and Debt to Tax Rebates – 
Evidence from Consumer Credit Data  WP-07-10 
Sumit Agarwal, Chunlin Liu, and Nicholas S. Souleles 
 
Portfolio Choice over the Life-Cycle when the Stock and Labor Markets are Cointegrated  WP-07-11 
Luca Benzoni, Pierre Collin-Dufresne, and Robert S. Goldstein 
 
Nonparametric Analysis of Intergenerational Income Mobility   WP-07-12 
with Application to the United States 
Debopam Bhattacharya and Bhashkar Mazumder 
 
How the Credit Channel Works: Differentiating the Bank Lending Channel  WP-07-13 
and the Balance Sheet Channel 
Lamont K. Black and Richard J. Rosen 
 
Labor Market Transitions and Self-Employment  WP-07-14 
Ellen R. Rissman 
 
First-Time Home Buyers and Residential Investment Volatility  WP-07-15 
Jonas D.M. Fisher and Martin Gervais 
 
Establishments Dynamics and Matching Frictions in Classical Competitive Equilibrium  WP-07-16 
Marcelo Veracierto 
 
Technology’s Edge: The Educational Benefits of Computer-Aided Instruction  WP-07-17 
Lisa Barrow, Lisa Markman, and Cecilia Elena Rouse 
 
The Widow’s Offering: Inheritance, Family Structure, and the Charitable Gifts of Women  WP-07-18 
Leslie McGranahan 
 
Demand Volatility and the Lag between the Growth of Temporary   
and Permanent Employment  WP-07-19 
Sainan Jin, Yukako Ono, and Qinghua Zhang 
 
A Conversation with 590 Nascent Entrepreneurs  WP-07-20 
Jeffrey R. Campbell and Mariacristina De Nardi 
 
Cyclical Dumping and US Antidumping Protection: 1980-2001  WP-07-21 
Meredith A. Crowley 
 
The Effects of Maternal Fasting During Ramadan on Birth and Adult Outcomes  WP-07-22 
Douglas Almond and Bhashkar Mazumder 
 6 
Working Paper Series (continued) 
 
The Consumption Response to Minimum Wage Increases  WP-07-23 
Daniel Aaronson, Sumit Agarwal, and Eric French 
 
The Impact of Mexican Immigrants on U.S. Wage Structure  WP-07-24 
Maude Toussaint-Comeau 
 
A Leverage-based Model of Speculative Bubbles  WP-08-01 
Gadi Barlevy 
 
Displacement, Asymmetric Information and Heterogeneous Human Capital  WP-08-02 
Luojia Hu and Christopher Taber 
 
BankCaR (Bank Capital-at-Risk): A credit risk model for US commercial bank charge-offs  WP-08-03 
Jon Frye and Eduard Pelz 
 
Bank Lending, Financing Constraints and SME Investment  WP-08-04 
Santiago Carbó-Valverde, Francisco Rodríguez-Fernández, and Gregory F. Udell 
 
Global Inflation  WP-08-05 
Matteo Ciccarelli and Benoît Mojon 
 
Scale and the Origins of Structural Change  WP-08-06 
Francisco J. Buera and Joseph P. Kaboski 
 
Inventories, Lumpy Trade, and Large Devaluations  WP-08-07 
George Alessandria, Joseph P. Kaboski, and Virgiliu Midrigan 
 
School Vouchers and Student Achievement: Recent Evidence, Remaining Questions  WP-08-08 
Cecilia Elena Rouse and Lisa Barrow 
 
Does It Pay to Read Your Junk Mail? Evidence of the Effect of Advertising on 
Home Equity Credit Choices  WP-08-09 
Sumit Agarwal and Brent W. Ambrose 
 